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I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act") replaced the
regulatory framework of a monopoly era with a radical deregulatory
approach that promised new consumer benefits through competitive market
forces. This new competition has never arrived, in large part because
politicians, regulators, and antitrust officials have allowed the telephone
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and cable companies to kill it. As a result, consumers are faced with few
choices and high prices for many telecommunications services in today's
marketplace.
Supporters of the 1996 Act assumed that deregulation would spur
competition---even in markets where competition has never existed or was
just unfolding-and prematurely relaxed ownership limitation, while
regulators allowed mergers based on theoretical and potential competition
that never materialized. This anticompetitive atmosphere has led to
consolidation in the form of mergers that most recently eliminated the two
largest competitors of the already consolidated Bell giants and possibly
permanently undermined the last vestige of good intentions behind the
1996 Act. Instead of the predicted nirvana of a free and open market with
numerous options for consumers and flourishing technology, we have
concentration and little marketplace choice.
Today, virtually all consumers have at most two choices for a full
package of telecommunications services: the local telephone company or
the cable company. 2 After more than a decade, the cable and telephone
industries remain highly concentrated, and the numbers tell the story. Cable
operators still have a seventy-two percent market share of the multichannel
video market. 3 Telephone companies have an eighty-five percent share of
local telephone subscribers, 4 seventy-five percent of long distance, 5 and
more than fifty percent of wireless customers. 6 High-speed Internet appears
to be split more evenly between the local cable and telephone companies
60-40, but if one7takes into account advanced services, it is closer to 80-20
in favor of cable.
The "cozy duopolies" that have been created have not brought
1. Consolidationin the TelecommunicationsIndustry: Has It Gone Too Far?:Hearing

before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary Comm., 105th Cong. 24 (1998) (written testimony of Gene Kimmelman)
[hereinafter Hearing].
2. SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCI Mergers: Remaking the Telecommunications Industry
Part ll-Another View: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and

Competition of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 68 (2005) (written
testimony of Gene Kimmelman).
3. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, para. 4 (2005), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-publiclattachmatch/FCC-05-13Al .pdf.
4. FCC, Trends in Telephone Service 8-11 tbl. 8.7 (2005), availableat http://www.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend6O5.pdf.
5. See id. 9-11 tbl. 9.6.
6. Proprietary data on file with author.
7. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, BROADBAND REALITY CHECK: TiE FCC IGNORES

AMERICA's DIGrrAL DIVIDE 3, 13-17, (2005), availableat http://www.hearusnow.org/
fileadmin/sitecontent/broadband-report-optimized.pdf.
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8
benefits to large segments of the consumer market on price or innovation.
In video, consolidation and anticompetitive bundling of programming has
led to cable rates increasing almost three times faster than the rate of
inflation. 9 Even satellite subscriber growth has failed to check these huge
increases. For the first time since the 1984 AT&T break-up, long-distance
prices for low-volume phone users have been on the rise. The enormous
price reductions for all phone revenue may be coming to an end as longterm contracts, early termination fees, and stagnating prices for low-volume
options persist. 10
Each cable or telecommunications giant has protected its own base of
services while staying out of others' service territory. In addition, they have
bundled services (e.g., cable with broadband) in order to keep potential
competitors, such as satellite service providers, at bay. This has resulted in
a lack of service options for consumers. Instead of paying and getting the
exact services they want, they must instead purchase packaged servicesDigital Subscriber Line ("DSL") tied to local phone service, or cable
modem service tied to a cable video package. Getting the benefits of a
discounted bundle causes the average household to expend much more for
a cluster of services, some of which they may or may not use. This is
definitely not the competitive landscape that Congress intended when it
passed the 1996 Act.

II. BY THE NUMBERS: FEEBLE COMPETITION
After passage of the 1996 Act, it was assumed that competition would
flourish among telecommunications companies. As explained in the Wall
Street Journal, "By sweeping away decades of regulation, Washington
thought it was paving the way for a free-for-all among the [Bell
long-distance carriers, cable operators and other
companies],
telecommunications providers. ' l Instead, it left an opening for companies
that were looking to merge in order to gain even more market share, thus
setting the stage for the union of SBC with AT&T and Verizon with MCI.
The SBC-AT&T and Verizon-MCI mergers mark the abandonment of
the competition model envisioned by the 1996 Act. AT&T and MCI were
the two largest non-Bell competitors in the local market (i.e., both the
residential and business markets). 12 They were also the largest long8. Hearing,supra note 1, at 24-25.
9. Id. at 26.
10. Id.

11. Bryan Gruley et al., IsThis Really What Congress Had inMind With The Telecom
Act?, WA L ST. J., May 12, 1998, at Al.
12. MARK COOPER, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, BROKEN PROMISES AND
STRANGLED COMPETITION: THE RECORD OF BABY BELL MERGER AND MARKET OPENING
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distance companies, with over half the market nationwide. 13
In fact, prior to the mergers, AT&T and MCI pursued various
approaches to providing services in the market and were the best
competitors to the Bell Operating Companies ("BOCs"). 14 "MCI played a
key 'maverick' role in the industry for decades .... Not only did it break

open the long distance monopoly 1 for residential customers, but it also
pioneered local competition ....,

MCI and AT&T provided a valuable

service to the industry that was important for true competition. Their lack
of presence will surely deal a "severe
blow to the competitive fabric of the
16
telecommunications industry."'
Similar to the aforementioned phone mergers, the pending Comcast,
Time Warner, and Adelphia transactions mark a similar milestone in the
cable industry. The two dominant cable operators will control close to fifty
percent of the national multichannel video programming distributor
("MVPD") market, which includes all pay-TV providers and sixty percent
of the cable market. 17 It is simply impossible for a cable channel to succeed
without getting carriage from both of these cable operators. This deal also
highlights the problems caused by creating large regional clusters where
cable operators are allowed to dominate.
The impact of the 1996 Act on consumer prices has been mixed at
best. Indeed, since its passage, cable rates have soared. Measured on a per
channel basis, they have increased by sixty-four percent. 18 This cable rate
increase is two and a half times the rate of inflation. 19 However, since
consumers do not get to buy cable service on a per channel basis, but are
forced to buy the whole bundle on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, one should
measure the impact as the increase in the monthly bill. Using that analysis,
we see that cable rate hikes have led to a near-doubling of the cost of the
average monthly cable bill. As a total monthly bill, they have increased

BEHAVIOR 4 (2005), available at http://www.consumeffed.org/telco-broken-promises.
pdf.
13. See id.
14. Id.

15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. See generally National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Industry
Statistics, http://www.ncta.com/industry-overview/indStats.cfm?statID=17
(last visited
Mar. 12, 2006) (providing basic statistical information regarding the state of the cable

industry).
18. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index:
December 2005; Consumer Price Index, All Urban Consumers, database, all items v. cable
and satellite. The Bureau of Labor statistics measures rate increase based on the additional
number of channels offered to consumers.
19. Id.
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eighty-six percent since 1995. 20 This means that the true cost 2of
cable has
1
increased at a rate that is almost four times the rate of inflation.
These swelling rates are not just affecting consumers who buy cable.
Local phone rates, which are still regulated, increased at just about the rate
of inflation. 22 Because competition never took much hold, there was some
discounting for big bundles of local service, but that was extinguished
when AT&T and MCI were gobbled up by SBC and Verizon. 23 In markets
where rces were deregulated prematurely, like special access, profits have
soared.
Wireless service charges, on the other hand, did not initially follow
the trend of increased prices. In fact, wireless service charges dropped in
price for a few years after the passage of the 1996 Act, due to new entrants
into the provider market. 25 However, in the past several years, as market
shares have stabilized, so too has pricing. 26 This trend in pricing
demonstrates how fewer providers and deregulation eventually leads to a
consolidated market and higher prices for consumers. Now that the three
largest national wireless providers are integrated with the dominant wire
companies by merger or joint venture (e.g., Verizon with Verizon Wireless,
AT&T with Cingular, and Sprint/Nextel with major cable companies),
prospects for price competition for stand-alone wireless service seem even
dimmer.
High-speed Internet service has also been affected, although in a
unique way. Pricing for high-speed Internet service has become bifurcated.

20. Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 20 F.C.C.R. 2718, att.
5 (2005),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-12AI.pdf [hereinafter Report on
Cable]. For eighty-six percent, divide 45.56 (Jan. 2004) by 24.43 (July 1995). See id. The
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") measures rate increases based on a total
monthly bill.
21. Taking the eighty-six percent price increase compared to CPI numbers from
January 2004 (the date of the latest FCC statistics), cable bills rose almost four times that of

inflation.
22. See PAUL R. ZIMMERMAN, INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. Div., REFERENCE BOOK OF
RATES, PRICE INDICES, AND HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES FOR TELEPHONE SERVICE tbl. 3.1,

cht. 2 (2005), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCCStateLink/IAD/ref05.pdf.
23. See COOPER, supra note 12, at 7, 30 (describing how big the big telcos bundle
Internet and local service in an anticompetitive manner).
24. See id. at 17-19.
25. Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, Tenth Report, 20 F.C.C.R. 15908, para. 154 (2005).
26. See id. paras. 155-57 (indicating a conflict of wireless price studies in 2004: one of
which claims that there has been a decrease in wireless prices, while another claims prices
have risen).
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The BOCs have discounted their slow-speed DSL service. 27 At $15 per
month, the cost is $20 per megabit download and over $100 per megabit
upload. 28 Cable has kept its prices high-about $60 per month on a stand
alone basis-but upped its speed. 29 However, it continues to cost about $10
per megabit download and well over $100 per megabit upload. 30 The
Japanese and Koreans enjoy high-speed Internet service at one-tenth the
price per megabit. In fact, there are almost half a dozen nations around
the world where prices are substantially lower and penetration of highspeed Internet is higher. 32 Thus, America is losing ground to other
countries where competition is creating a more innovative and consumerfriendly industry.

III. THE FUTURE
Since the 1996 Act has failed to produce the vigorous, head-to-head
competition that was originally promised, policymakers and the industry
are engaged in a major effort to redefine success. Currently the two
dominant companies argue that they are ready to compete with one another,
and that is all we need or can hope for. The policy they push in Congress
and at the FCC as a response to the failure of the 1996 Act proposes not
only to give up on the model of promoting new entrants into
communications, it aims to repeal the fundamental principles on which,
telecommunications were built in the past century. 33 Now that there are
two, end-to-end networks instead of one, they propose to repeal the
obligation of nondiscriminatory interconnection and carriage, which was
first written into the U.S. communications law almost 100 years ago.34
27. Dawn Kawamoto, Yahoo, Verizon Launch Co-branded DSL, CNET NEWS.COM,
Aug. 23, 2005, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5841915.html.
28. On a per megabit basis, Verizon offers a $14.95 plan of 768 kbps download and 128
kbps upload. The offer is available at http://www22.verizon.com/ForHomeDSL
channels/dsl/ packages/default.asp (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
29. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 5-6. Prices for cable modem broadband service are
roughly $45, prices for basic cable have risen to $13.80. Id. at 6 fig. 3. For $13.80, see
Report on Cable, supra note 20, at tbl. 1.
30. Based upon advertised speeds of 6 megabits download and .75 megabits upload
speeds.

31. Seeid. at6.
32. See INTERNATIONAL

TELECOMMUNICATION UNION, ITU INTERNET REPORTS: THE
INTERNET OF THINGS 15 (2005), http://www.itu.intldms-pub/itu-s/opb/pol/S-POL-IR.IT-

2005-SUM-PDF-E.pdf.
33. Staff Discussion Draft of the BroadbandBill: HearingBefore the H. Subcomm. on
Telecomm. and the Internet, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (testimony of Gene Kimmelman, Senior
Director of Public Policy and Advocacy Consumers Union), http://www.natoa.org/
publiclarticles/CU-CFATestimony.pdf.
34. For example, the Mann Elkins Act of 1910 amended the Interstate Commerce Act
to include telecommunications. Mann Elkins Act, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 539, 551 (1910).
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Each of the networks would be allowed to discriminate or be given a virtual
free hand to decide the terms and conditions of interconnection between
networks and carriage of traffic on their networks. However, the same
companies that predicted vigorous competition assure us that competition
dissuades them from discriminating. There is nothing in their past behavior
to support this claim.
There are some positive results that did occur within this deregulatory
atmosphere. While new entrants into the telecommunications field were
ultimately throttled by the incumbent network operators, they did make a
major contribution to the telecommunications landscape. As theory
predicted, they were the source of immense innovation. As the new
competitors entered the industry, they sought to find niches in which they
could survive. As a result, they introduced new business practices (e.g.,
electronic back office operations), led the way in deploying new facilities
(e.g., DSL), and developed new applications (e.g., Voice over Internet
Protocol ("VoIP")) 35 driving incumbents to emulate the innovations, but
then were allowed to extinguish the competition.
The great danger is that Congress is being pressed to declare the new
duopoly environment a victory and lock it in with policies that reinforce the
power of the two incumbents. However, without the threat of new entry,
the flow of innovation will stop.
In 1996, Congress assumed that new entrants could work their way
into the market, thus forcing the incumbents to become more competitive
outside their regions. 36 Whether it was the 1996 Act's design, as claimed
by some, or faulty implementation, as thought by others, the current reality
is that facilities-based competition for residential consumers is severely
limited. 37 The incumbents have shown that they have a strong incentive to
exclude competition and foreclose access to their networks. Because
network owners have market power and franchise services to defend, there
is no reason to believe that they will change their behavior.
More than telecommunications networks are at risk. The open nature
of the Internet could be undermined too. The Internet was conceived and
administered as an open communications entity as a matter of policy. 39 The
35.

Mark Cooper, Making the Network Connection, in OPEN ARCHITECTURE AS

COMMUNICATIONS POLCY 136-44 (Mark Cooper, ed. 2003), available at http://cyberlaw.
stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/openarchitecture.pdf.
36. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 253 (2000)).
37. COOPER, supra note 12, at 10.

38. See id. at 30.
39. See Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate
Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice
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FCC preserved the openness of the Internet when it required the telephone
companies to carry data in a nondiscriminatory manner, in a series of
decisions fittingly known as the Computer Inquiries. If the telephone
companies had not been required to open their networks, they would not
have acted so benevolently. AT&T and BellSouth have loudly declared
their intention to extract rents from Internet service providers and pick and
choose who can use their networks. Cable operators have also declared
41
their intention to be selective in offering quality of service guarantees.
This statement of intent is the antithesis of the Internet principles of
openness and neutrality.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would be a tragedy if policymakers conclude that vigorous
competition is unattainable and abandon its pursuit at the same time it
jettisons
appropriate
regulation.
If Congress settles for a
telecommunications market where there are a very small number of
competitors and capitulates to the demand that private networks rule,
consumers will pay higher prices and be given fewer real choices, while the
economy is starved of innovation. Without aggressive public policies that
promote increased competition and open returns, the market conditions
necessary to foster affordable and open democratic networks for
communications cannot survive.

of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.R. 16641, para. 3 (2000); Joint Application of AT&T Corporation and
Tele-Communications Inc. For Approval of Transfer of Control of Commission Licenses
and Authorizations, Petition to Deny of Consumers Union, CS Dkt No. 98-178, Oct. 28,
1998, http://www.consumersunion.org/other/1029filedc1098.htm.
40. See At SBC, It's All About "Scale and Scope," Bus. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005,

http://www.businessweek.com/@ @n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/magazine/content/05_45fb39580
92.htm.
41. See Peter Grant & Jesse Drucker, Phone, Cable Firms Rein In Consumers' Internet
Use, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2005, at Al.

